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Abstract
Patients who are in need of a new kidney and who have a living donor may
not be able to receive a kidney from the donor because of blood- or tissue-type
incompatibilities. If patient-donor pairs exchange kidneys, more kidney transplants
can be performed. In Sweden, no system for kidney exchange exists. This thesis
investigates how many more Swedish kidney patients could receive a new kidney if
a system for kidney exchange would be organized. Simulations based on a priority
mechanism are conducted in order to answer this question. The results suggest that
by using a priority mechanism, more Swedish patients could receive a new kidney.
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1 Introduction
When treating patients suffering from serious kidney disease, transplantation is the pre-
ferred treatment (Roth et al., 2005b, p. 457). There are three ways in how a patient can
receive a new kidney, either from a living donor with whom the patient has a relation, or
from a donor with whom the patient has no relation, or from a cadaveric donor. In Sweden,
the most common donations are either from a living donor with whom the patient has a
relation or from a cadaveric donor. In table 1, the development of kidney transplants in
Sweden for the period 2002-2011 are shown. In the second and third column, the number of
kidney transplants from living donors with whom the patient has a relation and cadaveric
donors are shown respectively.
Table 1: Swedish Kidney Transplants
Living Cadaveric Total Transplants Dead Total Patients
Y ear
2002 114 194 308 8 583
2003 130 215 345 5 532
2004 142 230 372 6 504
2005 172 219 391 19 485
2006 131 234 365 18 479
2007 123 256 379 21 505
2008 136 283 419 28 452
2009 164 229 393 19 480
2010 168 202 370 12 593
2011 184 251 435 27 634
It is clear from table 1 that there is a lack of supply of kidneys in Sweden. One of the
reasons that patients do not receive a new kidney through transplantation is because every
donor cannot donate to every patient. Due to mismatch of blood- and/or tissue-type, a
donor might not be able to donate his/her kidney to a patient (Roth et al., 2004, p. 461).
In Sweden today, patients who have a compatible living donor undergo a surgery
and receive a new kidney. Patients who have an incompatible or no donor are put on a
wait-list for receiving a cadaveric kidney. Patients usually wait between two to four years
before receiving a cadaveric kidney (Lennerling, 2012, p. 15-17). The responsibility for kid-
ney transplantations in Sweden, is divided among four hospitals which are responsible for
one geographical area respectively. The intention is that kidneys of donors from a certain
area should be used in that area. However, exchanges do occur between the hospitals and
between the Scandinavian countries (Sahlgrenska Universitetssjukhuset, 2004, chap. 1, p.
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2). In order to assign kidneys to the patients on the cadaver wait-list, patients are given a
priority. In general, the patient who has spent most time on the wait-list has the highest
priority. However, when determining a patient’s priority other characteristics are taken into
considerations as well such as tissue-type incompatibility and age. Furthermore, patients
on the cadaver wait-list are divided into different groups depending on blood-type. Thus,
patients on the cadaver wait-list are matched with cadaveric donors of the same blood-type
(Sahlgrenska Universitetssjukhuset, 2004, chap. 4, p. 14). If, in Sweden today, a patient
has an incompatible donor the donor is sent home and the patient is put on the cadaver
wait-list. Two questions arise, is this the only way to organize a kidney exchange system?
And, could there be a better way to organize such a system?
In 2004, a centralized kidney exchange clearinghouse was established in New Eng-
land, U.S.A. The clearinghouse uses a computerized matching algorithm to match patients
and donors such that as many patients as possible receive a new kidney (Roth et al.,
2005a). In 2012, 2000 patients had received a new kidney from participating in the cen-
tralized clearinghouse (Andersson and Lyttkens, 2012, p. 2277).
In comparison to the Swedish system, the clearinghouse in New England offered
two additional ways in which patients could improve their situation. In addition to receiv-
ing a kidney from a living donor with whom the patient has a relation or from a cadaveric
donor, the patients could participate in paired exchange and list exchange. Paired exchange
involves two patient-donor pairs. The basic idea is to exploit opportunities for exchanges of
kidneys between patient-donor pairs. Even though the patients are incompatible with their
donors, the donors might be compatible with the patient of the other pair. Thus, if the
patients exchange donors two kidney transplantations can be carried out. List exchange
occurs when a patient with an incompatible donor chooses to donate his/her donor’s kid-
ney to a patient on the cadaver wait-list. In return, the patient receives higher priority
on the cadaver wait-list. Both type of exchanges are welfare improving for patients since
they increase the supply of kidneys, thus allowing for more transplantations to be carried
out (Roth et al., 2004, p. 459). The question has been raised by Andersson and Lyttkens
(2012), whether a more advanced kidney exchange system should be organized in Sweden
where patients, to a larger extent, could participate in these exchanges. However, up until
2012 only one paired exchange has been carried out and list exchange is not an option for
Swedish patients (Lennerling, 2012, p. 15).
When organizing a kidney exchange system, the main issue is how to allocate
a finite number of kidneys to a finite number of patients such that as many patients as
possible receive a new kidney. In order to solve this problem, three matching mechanism
have been considered for matching patients with kidneys. The first mechanism is the Top
Trading Cycles mechanism (TTC) and can be applied when participating in a list exchange
is not an option for patients. What the Top Trading Cylces mechanism tries to do is to
find ways in which patient-donor pairs can trade kidneys with each other such that the
patients receive a new kidney. As a simple example, consider three patient-donor pairs:
(1, a), (2, b) and (3, c) where all patients are incompatible with their donor and thus no
kidney transplantations can be performed. However, donor a is compatible with patient
2, donor b is compatible with patient 3 and donor c is compatible with patient 1. If the
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three pairs trade their kidneys in the way indicated by their compatibilities, all patients
will receive a new kidney. Moreover, such exchanges could be extended to include any
number of patient-donor pairs. The TTC mechanism seeks to find opportunities for such
trades among patient-donor pairs in order for as many patients as possible to be given a
new kidney.
The second mechanism is the Top Trading Cycles and Chains mechanism (TTCC).
In addition to participate in trades as explained for the TTC mechanism, a patient can
also choose to donate his/her donor’s kidney to a patient on the cadaver wait-list. Thus,
the patient can participate in a list exchange and is rewarded high priority on the cadaver
wait-list. Moreover, more than one patient-donor pair can participate in such a donation.
Consider an example of two patient-donor pairs: (1, a) and (2, b) where both patients are
incompatible with their respective donors. Furthermore, donor b is compatible with patient
1 while donor a is incompatible with patient 2. Hence, the two pairs cannot trade kidneys
such that both patients receive a new kidney. However, patient 2 would like to improve
his/her situation by donating his/her donor’s kidney to a patient on the cadaver wait-list.
The TTCC mechanism then seeks to find a way in which as many patients as possible can
benefit from this type of exchange. In our example, donor b would donate his/her kidney
to patient 1 while donor a donates his/her kidney to a patient on the cadaver wait-list.
Thus, patient 1 and a patient on the cadaver wait-list receive a new kidney. Moreover,
patient 2 receives high priority on the cadaver wait-list which increases his/her probability
of receiving a new kidney. The TTCC mechanism seeks to match patients with kidneys
through these two exchanges.
The third mechanism is the priority mechanism. In general, a priority mechanism
only consider pairwise exchanges, i.e. trades between two patient-donor pairs. Moreover,
participating in list exchange is a possibility for patients and every patient is given a pri-
ority. A priority mechanism starts with the patient who has the highest priority and seeks
to match him/her with another pair, if trading kidneys is a possibility. The priority mech-
anism continues in this fashion according to the priority ordering, matching compatible
patients, never sacrificing a higher priority patient for a lower priority patient. Whenever
a patient cannot be found a matching, the priority mechanism skips that patient. In this
way, a priority mechanism matches as many patients as possible.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how many more Swedish patients could
receive a new kidney if a more sophisticated matching mechanism was used. In order to
answer this question, different scenarios will be simulated using a priority mechanism.
2 A Kidney Exchange Model
The model presented in this section is based on Roth et al. (2004), So¨nmez and U¨nver
(2011) and Roth et al. (2005b). In a kidney exchange matching problem, there exist
N = {n1, . . . , nn} patient-donor pairs where the patient is in need of a new kidney. Let
N = NI ∪ NC be such that NC is the set of patients who have a compatible living donor
and NI be the set of patients who have an incompatible living donor. Any ni ∈ N is
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referred to as a patient-donor pair. Moreover, let pi and di denote the patient and the
donor of pair ni respectively. In addition, there exist a set C = {c1, . . . , cn} of cadaver
donors not associated with any patient in particular when entering the kidney exchange
matching problem. Let M = {m1, . . . ,mn} be the set of patients who do no not have a
living donor.
A patient is compatible with a donor if the donor can medically donate his/her kidney
to the patient. Two pairs n1, n2 ∈ N are mutually compatible if the donor of pair n1 is
compatible with the patient of pair n2 and the donor of pair n2 is compatible with the
patient of pair n1. Furthermore, the option of participating in a list exchange is denoted
by w.
Whether a donor can medically donate to a patient or not is determined by two
genetic characteristics. The first characteristic is the ABO blood-type of the patient and
the donor. There exist four blood-types: O, A, B and AB, given no other complications:
• A donor of blood-type O can donate to any patient
• A donor of blood-type A can either donate to a patient of blood-type A or AB
• A donor of blood-type B can either donate to a patient of blood-type B or AB
• A donor of blood-type AB can only donate to a patient of blood-type AB
Thus, given no other complications a patient of blood-type AB can receive any kind of
kidney, while a patient of blood-type O can only receive kidneys of blood-type O. The
second genetic characteristic that affect compatibility is tissue type, or the HLA type of
the patient and the donor. HLA type is determined by six proteins and an increase in
mismatch between the patient and the donor decreases the chance of survival of the
transplanted organ. Therefore, prior to transplantation a crossmatch test is conducted. If
the patient has preformed antibodies against the donor’s kidney, donation is not possible
and the patient and the donor are incompatible. Incompatibility due to HLA type
mismatch is known as positive crossmatch.
For each pair ni ∈ N , let ni denote patient of pair ni’s preference relation over
N ∪ w. Moreover, let ni be the strict preference relation and ∼ni be the indifference
relation associated with ni . The preference relation ni is determined by the
compatibility between the patient of the pair and all donors and if w is considered
acceptable. A patient is assumed to be indifferent between any compatible donor and to
strictly prefer any compatible donor to an incompatible. Moreover, a patient who is
incompatible with his/her donor strictly prefers his/her donor to any other incompatible
donor. In other words, the patient strictly prefers to remain unmatched than to be
matched with another incompatible donor. It is assumed that only patients incompatible
with their donor, i.e. ni ∈ NI consider the wait-list option, w acceptable. There is a
decreased chance of survival for a cadaveric kidney compared to for a kidney from a living
donor. Therefore, patients strictly prefer a compatible living donor to a compatible
cadaveric donor. For any pair with an incompatible donor, ni ∈ NI :
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• n1 ∼ni n2 for any n1, n2 ∈ N and n1 6= n2, where the donors of pair n1 and
n2 are compatible with the patient of pair ni
• n1 ni ni for any n1 ∈ N , where the donor of the pair n1 is compatible
with the patient of pair ni
• ni ni n1 for any n1 ∈ N , where the donor of the pair n1 is incompatible
with the patient of pair ni
• n1 ni w for any n1 ∈ N , where the donor of the pair n1 is compatible
with the patient of pair ni
For any pair with a compatible donor, nc ∈ NC :
• n1 ∼nc n2 for any n1, n2 ∈ N and n1 6= n2, where the donors of pair n1 and
n2 are compatible with the patient of pair nc
• n1 ∼nc nc for any n1 ∈ N , where the donor of pair n1 is compatible with
the patient of pair nc
• nc nc n1 for any n1 ∈ N , where the donor of pair n1 is incompatible with
the patient of pair nc
A kidney exchange problem is denoted (N,), where = (nj)nj∈N is the collection of
preferences for all pairs. A matching µ is a function such that for any pair nj ∈ N , either:
• µ(nj) = nk for any nk ∈ N or
• µ(nj) = w or
• µ(nj) = nj
Thus, for any matching µ and pair nj ∈ N , µ(nj) = nj means that pair nj is unmatched.
If for any two pairs nj, nk ∈ N , a matching µ is such that µ(nj) = nk and µ(nk) = nj,
pair nj and nk are mutually compatible and a kidney exchange is carried out. For a
matching µ, any kidney belonging to a pair nj ∈ N can only be assigned to one patient.
However, the wait-list option w can be assigned to any number of patients. A mechanism
ϕ is a systematic procedure which finds a matching µ for a kidney exchange problem.
For any kidney exchange problem (N,), a matching needs to be selected. Due
to blood-type incompatibility and positive crossmatch, performing a kidney exchange
between a patient and a donor might not be possible. For the same reasons, trying to
organize exchanges between patients and donors is not always straightforward. Therefore,
a sophisticated mechanism is required which ensures that as many patients as possible
are given a new kidney. Such mechanisms will be discussed in the following section.
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3 Theoretical Overview
This section will present three mechanisms applicable for selecting a matching to a
kidney exchange problem. In section 3.1 the Top Trading Cycles mechanism will be
discussed. Section 3.2 will outline the Top Trading Cycles and Chains mechanism.
Moreover, priority mechanisms will be discussed in section 3.3. Finally, section 3.4
present a discussion of why these mechanisms are desirable.
The simulations presented in this paper are based on a priority mechanism.
However, since the TTC and TTCC mechanisms are related to the priority mechanism
and illustrate important concepts of the matching procedure well, these mechanisms will
too be presented.
3.1 The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
Consider a kidney exchange system where list exchange is not an option, such as in
Sweden today. What the Top Trading Cylces mechanism (TTC) tries to do is to find
ways in which patient-donor pairs can trade kidneys with each other in order for as many
patients as possible to receive a new kidney. Moreover, these trades can include any
number of patient-donor pairs.
Formally, the preference relation is slightly changed such that for each pair
ni ∈ N , let ni denote patient of pair ni’s preference relation over N . In a setting where
list exchange is not an option, David Gale’s Top Trading Cycles mechanism can be used
for selecting a matching (Roth et al., 2004, p. 465).
Let a cycle be an ordered list of patients and donors, (d1, p1, d2, p2,. . ., di, pi)
such that donor d1 points toward patient p1, patient p1 points toward donor d2,. . ., donor
di points toward patient pi and patient pi points toward donor d1 (Roth et al., 2004, p.
466) (Roth et al., 2005a, p. 377). Gale’s Top Trading Cycles algorithm can now be
introduced:
Algorithm 1. The Top Trading Cycles Algorithm
Step 1: Each patient starts by pointing toward his/her most preferred donor. At least
one cycle is formed. For each cycle formed, the corresponding trades are carried out, i.e.,
each patient receives the kidney from the donor at whom he/she is pointing. After the
trades are conducted, the pairs belonging to the cycles are removed.
Step k: In general, every remaining patient points toward his/her most preferred donor
of those still available. At least one cycle is formed and the corresponding trades are
carried out. All pairs which participated in a trade are removed.
The algorithm continues in the same fashion until no agents are left and patients receive
the kidney of the donor at whom they were pointing to when being removed by the
algorithm (Roth et al., 2004, p. 462).
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Let us consider a simple example of four patient-donor pairs to clarify how the
algorithm works in comparison to the system currently used in Sweden. For simplicity,
assume that there exist no positive crossmatch between any patient and any donor. As
mentioned earlier, for each pair ni let pi and di denote the patient and the donor of the
pair ni respectively. Consider the following four patient-donor pairs and their
corresponding blood-types:
• n1: p1 - O, d1 - A
• n2: p2 - A, d2 - B
• n3: p3 - B, d3 - AB
• n4: p4 - AB, d4 - O
Figure 1: Example of the TTC Algorithm - One Cycle is Found
Assume that the patients have the following preferences over all pairs:
• n1: n4 n1 n1 n1 n2 ∼n1 n3
• n2: n1 n2 n4 n2 n2 n2 n3
• n3: n2 n3 n4 n3 n3 n3 n1
• n4: n3 n4 n4 n4 n1 n4 n2
In Sweden today, only patients of compatible pairs would receive a new kidney. Thus,
only the patient of the pair n4 would receive a new kidney. The remaining three patients
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would be put on the wait-list for cadaveric donors. If the TTC mechanism was to be used
instead, in step 1 of the algorithm, the following cycle would be formed: (d1, p1, d4, p4,
d3, p3, d2 p2,). The cycle is depicted in figure 1. The TTC mechanism selects the
following matching:
• µ(n1) = n4
• µ(n2) = n1
• µ(n3) = n2
• µ(n4) = n3
Using the TTC mechanism, all four patients receive a new kidney.
3.2 The Top Trading Cycles and Chains Mechanism
In order to incorporate the possibility for patients to participate in list exchange, the Top
Trading Cycles and Chains Mechanism (TTCC) can be used. In addition to participate
in cycles as explained for the TTC mechanism, a patient can also choose to donate
his/her donor’s kidney to a patient on the cadaver wait-list. Thus, the patient can
participate in a list exchange and is rewarded high priority on the cadaver wait-list.
Moreover, more than one patient-donor pair can participate in a list exchange. The
TTCC mechanism then seeks to find a way in which as many patients as possible can
benefit from participating in cycles and list exchanges.
As outlined in section 2, for each pair ni ∈ N , let ni denote patient of pair ni’s
preference relation over N ∪ w. Let a w − chain be an ordered list of pairs: (d1, p1, d2,
p2,. . ., di−1, pi−1, di, pi) such that donor d1 points toward patient p1, patient p1 points
toward donor d2,. . ., donor di−1 points toward patient pi−1, patient pi−1 points toward
donor di, donor di points toward the patient pi and patient pi points toward w. As a
w-chain is selected, patient p1 receives a kidney from donor d2,. . ., patient pi−1 receives a
kidney from donor di, patient pi is rewarded high priority on the cadaver wait-list and the
kidney of donor d1 is donated to a patient on the cadaver wait-list (Roth et al., 2004, p.
466). At the same step of the mechanism there might exist more than one w-chain.
Therefore, a chain selection rule is needed to select which w-chain to carry out1. In
similarity with the TTC mechanism, some patients will receive a final assignment and be
removed by the TTCC mechanism. However, depending on the chain selection rule some
pairs might be given an assignment while not being removed. These pairs are thus given
a passive role during a segment of the algorithm.
The Top Trading Cycles and Chains algorithm can now be introduced:
Algorithm 2. The Top Trading Cycles and Chains Algorithm
1For a discussion of different chain selection rules and their implications see Roth et al. (2004)
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Step 1: At the start, all patients are active and all kidneys are available. At each stage,
every patient points toward his/her most preferred donor of those still available, or w.
Every passive patient points toward his/her given assignment and each donor points
toward the patient of his/her pair.
Step 2: There exists either a cycle, a w-chain, or both. If a cycle does not exist, go to
step 3. Otherwise, locate the cycle, perform the corresponding trades and remove all pairs
forming the cycle. Continue in the same fashion, each remaining patient points toward
his/her most preferred donor of those still remaining and carry out every cycle found.
Repeat this procedure until no more cycles are formed.
Step 3: If there are no patients left, the algorithm is terminated. Otherwise, there exists
at least one w-chain. In accordance with the chain selection rule, a w-chain is selected
and the assignments for the patients in the w-chain is final. The chain selection rule also
determines whether the w-chain is removed or not.
Step 4: After the selection of a w-chain, new cycles might be able to be formed. Repeat
step 2 and 3 with the remaining active patients and donors until no patient remains.
Once the algorithm is done, every patient of each pair is either assigned a kidney or the
list exchange option w. However, every patient might not receive a new kidney through
transplantation since a patient might prefer to be matched with his/her incompatible
donor rather than to be matched with a donor of a different pair (Roth et al., 2004, p.
468-469).
A simple example can be considered to illustrate the TTCC mechanism. This
example is constructed in such a way that no considerations of chain selection rules have
to be made. Assume that our kidney exchange population is extended from the example
in section 3.1 to include the following two patient-donor pairs and their corresponding
blood-types:
• n5: p5 - O, d5 - B
• n6: p6 - B, d6 - AB
Assume that preferences for the six pairs are extended to be the following:
• n1: n4 n1 n1 n1 n2 ∼n1 n3 ∼n1 n5 ∼n1 n6 n1 w
• n2: n1 n2 n4 n2 n2 n2 n3 ∼n2 n5 ∼n2 n6 n2 w
• n3: n2 n3 n5 n3 n4 n3 n3 n3 n1 ∼n3 n6 n3 w
• n4: n3 n4 n6 n4 n4 n4 n2 n4 n5 n4 n1 n4 w
• n5: n4 n5 w n5 n5 n5 n2 ∼n5 n3 ∼n5 n6 ∼n5 n1
• n6: n2 n6 n5 n6 n4 n6 w n6 n6 n6 n3 ∼n6 n1
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Figure 2: Example of the TTCC Algorithm, Round 1 - One Cycle is Found
With the current Swedish system, the patient belonging to pair n4 would be the only one
receiving a new kidney. The remaining patients would be put on the cadaver wait-list.
However, applying the TTCC algorithm to this kidney exchange problem would yield a
completely different outcome. In the first step of the first round of the algorithm, every
patient points toward his/her most preferred donor. In step 2, the following cycle is
formed: (d1, p1, d4, p4, d3, p3, d2 p2,). The pairs forming the cycle are removed and their
assignment is final. Next, a second round of step 2 is conducted and the following
w-chain is formed: (d6, p6, d5, p5). In step 3 of the algorithm the w-chain is carried out.
Thus, patient p5 receives high priority on the cadaver wait-list, patient p6 receives a new
kidney from donor d5 and a patient on the cadaver wait-list receives a new kidney from
donor d6. In figure 2 and figure 3 the first and second round of the TTCC algorithm are
depicted. The TTCC algorithm selects the following matching:
• µ(n1) = n4
• µ(n2) = n1
• µ(n3) = n2
• µ(n4) = n3
• µ(n5) = w
• µ(n6) = n5
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Using the TTCC mechanism for selecting a matching to the kidney exchange problem,
five patients with a living donor are given a new kidney. In addition, one patient on the
cadaver wait-list is given a new kidney from a living donor. Thus, in total six patients are
given a new kidney and one patient has increased his/her chance of receiving a cadaveric
kidney.
Figure 3: Example of the TTCC Algorithm, Round 2 - One w-chain is Found
3.3 Priority Mechanisms
When the theory regarding kidney exchange was developed, patients were assumed to
have strict preferences and unbound sizes of cycles/w-chains were considered possible.
However, based on medical expertise Roth et al. (2005b) developed the theory to be
compatible with binary preferences and cycles/w-chains limited to two patient-donor
pairs. It seemed reasonable to assume that any patient would consider any compatible
living donor equally preferable. Moreover, any exchange of kidneys is preferred to be
conducted simultaneously for incentive reasons. A paired exchange involves four
simultaneous surgical teams, a three-way exchange six simultaneous surgical teams etc.
Thus, for logistical reasons large cycles/w-chains of pairs would be difficult to perform.
Therefore, limiting the cycles/w-chains to only include two pairs was considered a first
step for a practical implementation of a kidney exchange mechanism in New England
(Roth et al., 2005b, p. 153).
Given the constraints of limiting the cycles/w-chains to include only two pairs
and for patients to have binary preferences, the TTC and TTCC mechanisms could no
longer be used. Both mechanisms require patients to have strict preferences over all
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donors. Therefore, Priority Mechanisms were considered for solving the, slightly
different, kidney exchange problem. In order to apply a priority mechanism, a priority
ordering has to be given to the patients. In accordance with the priority ordering, a
priority mechanism tries to match mutually compatible patients. The mechanism starts
by trying to find a mutually compatible patient for the patient who has the highest
priority continuing with the patient who has the second highest priority etc. If no match
can be found for a patient, the mechanism skips that patient. Moreover, a patient with
higher priority is never sacrificed for a patient with lower priority. In this way, the
priority mechanism matches as many patients as possible (Roth et al., 2005b, p. 158).
Formally, let an individual rational matching be such that for any nk ∈ N if
µ(nk) 6= nk then µ(nk) nk nk. In other words, a matching µ will only be considered if
two pairs are mutually compatible. Let M be the set of individual rational matchings.
Since only individual rational matchings are considered, focus can be put on a reduced
kidney exchange problem induced by a mutual compatibility matrix. For any patients of
pair ni, nj ∈ N , let R = [rni,nj ]ni∈N,nj∈N be an | N | × | N | mutual compatibility matrix,
with element:
rni,nj =
{
1 if nj ni ni and ni nj nj
0 otherwise
(N,R) is considered a reduced problem of (N,ni) (Roth et al., 2005b, p. 156).
As mentioned in section 1, allocating cadaveric kidneys to patients is done in
accordance with the priority of each patient. A priority mechanism extends this thinking
to patients with living donors as well. Let a priority ordering be such that the ith patient
of pair ni has priority i. Let the natural ordering (1, 2, 3,. . ., i) be the priority ordering of
all patients such that patient belonging to pair ni is the patient with priority i for each
ni ∈ N . A priority function is a non-negative function pi : N −→ R+, if it is increasing in
priority, i.e. if pi(ni) ≥ pi(ni+1).
A hospital H wants to maximize the number of transplants possible given its
preferences H over all matchings. Let Mµ = {ni ∈ N : µ(ni) 6= ni}, i.e. the number of
patients matched at matching µ. If H is responsive to the priority ordering it is a
priority preference. Then, µ H µ′ if Mµ′ ⊂Mµ, or if for any two patients who belong to
pair ni, nj ∈ N , i < j, Mµ\Mµ′ = {ni} and Mµ′\Mµ = {nj}. Hence, a matching µ is
preferred to some other matching µ′ if more patients are matched in µ or if patients of
higher priority are matched in µ.
Let every matching in E i be a priority matching. Given a priority ordering (1, 2,
3,. . . , i) and a reduced problem (N,R), a priority mechanism selects a matching in the
following way (Roth et al., 2005b, p. 158-159):
• let E0 =M, be the set of all matchings
• In general for j ≤ i, let E j ⊆ E j−1 be such that:
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E j =
{
{µ ∈ E j−1 : µ(nj) 6= nj} if ∃ µ ∈ E j−1 : µ(nj) 6= nj,
E j−1 otherwise
Respecting the priority ordering of patients, a priority mechanism selects a priority
matching such that as many patients as possible are matched. Only mutually compatible
pairs are matched and a patient for whom a matching cannot be found is skipped.
Let us consider a simple example where a priority mechanism, at each step,
intends to match the patient in consideration with the patient who has the highest
priority of the remaining patients. Consider the following five patient donor-pairs with
corresponding blood-types and the priority ordering (1, 2, 3, 4, 5):
• n1: p1 - O, d1 - A
• n2: p2 - A, d2 - O
• n3: p3 - O, d3 - AB
• n4: p4 - B, d4 - A
• n5: p5 - A, d5 - B
Figure 4: Example of the Priority Mechanism - Two Cycles are Found
All cycles found by the priority mechanism are depicted in figure 4. Using the current
Swedish system, only the patient of the pair n2 would receive a new kidney. The priority
mechanism selects the following matching:
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• µ(n1) = n2
• µ(n2) = n1
• µ(n3) = n3
• µ(n4) = n5
• µ(n5) = n4
Using the priority mechanism, four patients receive a new kidney. The only patient not
receiving a kidney is the patient belonging to pair n3.
3.4 The Axioms
The reason for considering the mechanisms discussed in section 3.1 - 3.3 is that they
satisfy desirable axioms. In this context, two important axioms are Pareto efficiency and
strategy-proofness. A matching µ is Pareto efficient if there exists no other matching ν
where all patients are weakly better off and some patients are strictly better off. Hence,
in a Pareto efficient matching no patient’s situation can be improved without making the
situation of another patient worse. Moreover, a Pareto efficient mechanism always
chooses a Pareto efficient matching (Roth et al., 2004, p. 472). A mechanism is
strategy-proof if no patient can gain from lying. There are two ways in which patients
can lie, either by misrepresenting their preferences or, if the patient has more than one
donor, by not reporting all of his/her donors.
Efficiency is important since it is essential that patients are as well off as
possible. A situation not desirable is when there exist two patient-donor pairs who do not
receive a new kidney even though they are mutually compatible. An efficient mechanism
assures that this is not the case. Strategy-proofness implies that by truthfully reporting
their preferences and available donors, patients maximize their chance of receiving a new
kidney (Roth et al., 2005b, p. 159). A strategy-proof mechanism makes it easier and safer
for patients to participate. Since no advanced strategies for reporting preferences and
donors have to be considered, the system is fair and no time has to be spent learning the
system in order to develop advanced strategies.
Formally, a matching µ is Pareto efficient if there exists no other matching ν
such that: ν ni µ ∀ ni ∈ N and ν ni µ for some ni ∈ N (Roth et al., 2005b, p. 156).
Let Rni be the strategy space of the patient belonging to pair ni and ′ni be a
misrepresentation of preferences. If ∀ ni ∈ N , ∀ ni ,′ni∈ Rni and ∀ −ni∈ R−ni a
mechanism ϕ makes truthful preference revelation a dominant strategy, then:
ϕ[−ni ,ni ](ni) ni ϕ[−ni ,′ni ](ni) (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2010, p.7).
For a kidney exchange problem and strict preferences the TTC mechanism is
efficient (Ma, 1994) and makes truthful preference revelation a dominant strategy for
patients (Roth, 1982).
Theorem 1. The Top Trading Cycles mechanism is efficient and strategy-proof.
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Extending the kidney exchange problem to include list exchange, Roth et al. (2004) show
that for any chain selection rule which do not remove a selected w-chain at any
non-terminal stage, the TTCC mechanism is efficient. For a wide range of chain selection
rules, the TTCC mechanism makes truthful preference revelation a dominant strategy.
Theorem 2. For specific choices of chain selection rules2, the Top Trading Cycles and
Chains mechanism is efficient and strategy-proof.
Restricting the attention to paired exchange and binary preferences, Roth et al. (2005b)
show that a priority mechanism is efficient and that truthful preference revelation as well
as reporting the full set of available donors are dominant strategies for patients.
Theorem 3. A Priority mechanism is efficient and strategy-proof.
4 Simulations
The object of the simulations is to determine how many Swedish patients would have
received a new kidney if a priority mechanism had been used for finding a matching to
the 2011 matching problem. The priority mechanism will start with the patient who has
the highest priority, and at each step, try to match the patient with the patient who has
the highest priority of the remaining patients. Only pairwise exchanges will be considered
and for a match between two patient-donor pairs to occur the pairs have to be mutually
compatible. When the cycles/w-chains are limited to two pairs, finding the maximal
number of exchanges possible is best done by using Jack Edmond’s3 algorithm (Roth
et al., 2005a, p. 378). However, for computational simplicity the simulations in this paper
will not be based on Jack Edmond’s algorithm. Thus, the simulated results can be
improved.
Patients will have binary preferences which are generated in accordance with
section 2. Following Roth et al. (2005a, p. 378), two different scenarios for list exchanges
are considered. Either list exchange is unavailable, or 40 percent of the patients with an
incompatible donor consider participating in a w-chain an acceptable option.
Furthermore, no dynamic considerations are made. All patients and donors are assumed
to be available at the same time which is not very realistic. In this sense, the results from
the simulations can be seen as an upper bound. Moreover, the simulations will consider
so called altruistically unbalanced exchange. Consider two pairs n1, n2 ∈ N where the
donor of pair n1 is compatible with both patients, while the donor of pair n2 is only
compatible with the patient of pair n1. Since pair n1 and n2 are mutually compatible, a
kidney exchange can be performed. However, since the donor of pair n1 is compatible
with the patient of his/her pair, such an exchange would be unlikely to occur in real life
(Roth et al., 2005a, p. 377). Even so, considerations of altruistically unbalanced exchange
make it possible to define an upper bound for what the mechanism could achieve.
2for more details see (Roth et al., 2004).
3For more details regarding the algorithm see Roth et al. (2005b)
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In 2011, the number of patients receiving a kidney from a living donor with
whom the patient has a relation was 184. However, there is no data on how many of the
remaining 423 patients who actually have a living donor with whom the patient is
incompatible. Therefore, when conducting the simulations, out of the 423 patients, the
share of patients who have an incompatible donor will be varied between 0 and 100 %.
Hence, due to the uncertainty regarding patients with incompatible donors different
scenarios will be simulated as a sensitivity analysis. In real life, whether a patient has a
donor or not probably depends on the size of the patient’s social network, i.e. the size of
the patient’s family and the number of his/her friends.
According to Roth et al. (2005a, p. 377), the performance of a kidney exchange
matching is largely dependent on the following four factors:
1. The number of patients and donors registered in the database.
2. Whether list exchange is an option or not.
3. The maximum number of patients who can participate in a cycle/w-chain.
4. If altruistically unbalanced exchange is possible.
Since the simulations only consider two-way exchanges, the matching could be improved
by increasing the number of participants in the cycles/w-chains. However, Roth et al.
(2007) simulate different sizes of cycles/w-chains. They conclude that two-way exchanges
account for a large part of the potential gains when using a matching mechanism.
Increasing to three-way exchanges, almost all gains are exploited.
4.1 The Patient-Donor Population
In 2011, the number of patients in need of a kidney was 634. As a first step in the
simulations and in accordance with section 3.3, patients are randomly assigned a priority.
However, in the same year 27 patients on the cadaver wait-list died. Since these patients
are probably too weak to survive an operation, the simulations will not consider these 27
patients. As a second step, 27 patients are removed at random from the total list of
patients leaving the list at 607 patients in need of a new kidney. Next, the 607 patients
have to be given a blood-type. The distribution of blood-types for the Swedish
population is shown in table 2 (Blodcentralen, 2012). Since no data is available of the
actual distribution of blood-types among the Swedish kidney patient-donor population,
the information in table 2 will be used to assign blood-types to all patients.
In proceeding, 184 patients are randomly selected to form the set of patients
with compatible donors, i.e. NC , leaving the cadaver wait-list at 423 patients. The next
step is to assign a blood-type to each donor of each compatible pair. Since the patients
and the donors of each pair are compatible, no considerations have to be made regarding
positive crossmatch. Conditional on the blood type of the patient, a blood-type has to be
assigned to each donor of each compatible pair. Given the patient’s blood-type and based
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Table 2: Distribution of Blood-types For The Swedish Population.
Blood-type Frequency
O 38 %.
A 44 %.
B 12 %.
AB 6 %.
on the information in table 2, the following distribution of blood-types is used for
assigning the compatible donors a blood-type:
Table 3: Distribution of Blood-types For Donors of Compatible Pairs.
Frequency of Donor Blood-type
O A B AB
Patient Blood-type
O 100 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
A 46 % 54 % 0 % 0 %
B 76 % 0 % 24 % 0 %
AB 38 % 44 % 12 % 6 %
As the set NC is fully defined, the next step is to randomly select the patients who belong
to the set NI , i.e. the patients who have an incompatible donor. As discussed in
section 4, different shares of patients belonging to this set will be considered. After the
share is determined, patients are selected at random from the cadaver wait-list to form
part of the set NI . These patients are removed from the cadaver wait-list while
maintaining their priority.
Assigning blood-types to the donors of the pairs belonging to NI is not as simple
as for the pairs forming the set NC . Since, as discussed in section 2, incompatibility
between the patient and the donor can stem from either blood-type mismatch or positive
crossmatch. There is no data available on the risk for positive crossmatch between
Swedish patient-donor pairs. Therefore, simulations will be based on data from Roth
et al. (2005a, p. 378). The risk for positive crossmatch between a patient and a random
donor will be considered to be 11%. Furthermore, for a female patient whose donor is her
spouse the risk is increased to 33% due to that antibodies can develop during child birth.
There is no Swedish data available on how many of the patients are females nor how
many donors are husbands of the patients. Therefore, data from Roth et al. (2007, p.
839) will be used. Data which is based on the American patient-donor population. The
data is presented in table 4. Based on the information in table 4 and the risks for positive
crossmatch, 11% and 33%, the risk for positive crossmatch between an incompatible
patient-donor pair is 15%.
When generating incompatible donor blood-types, two scenarios are considered:
19
Table 4: Patient Gender and Unrelated Living Donors
Gender Frequency
Female 40.90 %.
Male 59.10 %.
Unrelated Living Donor Frequency
Spouse 48.97 %.
Other 51.03 %.
Either, the patient and the donor are blood-type compatible but there is a positive
crossmatch between the two generating the incompatibility. In these cases, donor
blood-types follow the distribution presented in table 3. Otherwise, patients are
blood-type incompatible and, conditional on the blood-type of the patient, donor
blood-types are simulated using the distribution presented in table 5:
Table 5: Distribution of Blood-types For Donors of Blood-Type Incompatible Pairs.
Frequency of Donor Blood-type
O A B AB
Patient Blood-type
O 0 % 71 % 19 % 10 %
A 0 % 0 % 67 % 33 %
B 0 % 88 % 0 % 12 %
AB 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
A patient having blood-type AB cannot be blood-type incompatible with a donor.
Therefore, whenever a patient has blood-type AB and is incompatible with the donor the
pair has a positive crossmatch. Thus, the blood-type of the donor is generated based on
the distribution in table 3.
So far, all patients and living donors have been given a blood-type. The only set
of agents not assigned a blood-type is the set of cadaveric donors, i.e. C. It is assumed
that the distribution of blood-types of the cadaveric donors follow the distribution of the
Swedish population. Therefore, 251 cadaveric donors are randomly assigned a blood-type
based on table 2.
4.2 The Matching
In order to conduct the matching, compatibilities and thus preferences have to be
determined between all patient-donor pairs. For any pair ni ∈ N , the compatibility of the
pair has been determined. Since all patients and donors have been assigned a blood-type
and the risk for positive crossmatch between a random donor and a patient is 11 %,
compatibilities between all patient-donor pairs can be decided.
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Regardless if list exchange is an option or not, the first step of the matching is, in
accordance with the patient priority ordering, to match the compatible and incompatible
patient-donor pairs with each other. As a second step, compatible patient-donor pairs,
not matched at the first step, are matched with each other. If list exchange is available,
the following third step is conducted: Patient-donor pairs, not matched in the previous
steps, who prefer to participate in a list exchange do so by forming a w-chain with
another pair. The patient who initiates the w-chain receives top priority on the cadaver
wait-list. Next, patients with a living donor who were not matched in the previous steps
are added to the cadaver wait-list. As a fourth step, patients on the cadaver wait-list are
matched with cadaveric donors of the same blood-type and in accordance with the
priority ordering. If list exchange is not a possibility, the third step vanishes and we go
directly from step 2 to step 4. Conducting the simulations, 100 Monte-Carlo trials are
performed to obtain an average result for the different matching mechanisms.
5 Results
Simulations of the priority mechanism, with and without list exchange, suggest that an
adoption of either mechanism is favorable to the current system. Results are presented in
tables 6, 7, and in figure 5. In table 6, results from using the priority mechanism not
allowing for list exchange are presented. As mentioned in section 4, the number of
patients who have an incompatible donor is not known. There are 423 patients who
either have an incompatible donor or no living donor. In the first column of table 6, the
share of the 423 patients having an incompatible donor is shown. Thus, if share is 50% on
average 211.5 patients have an incompatible donor and 211.5 patients do not have a
living donor. The second column reports the number of paired kidney exchanges which
have been conducted. The third column reports the number of compatible pairs matched.
The fourth column is the number of patients who have been matched with a cadaveric
donor. Column five reports the total number of patients who have received a new kidney
from using the priority mechanism. Finally, the share of total patients receiving a new
kidney is reported in column 6. In table 7, results from using the priority mechanism
with list exchange are presented. Column 1-3 report the same as in table 6. However,
column 4 reports the number of kidney exchanges occurring from patients participating
in list exchanges. Column 5 reports the number of patients matched with a cadaveric
donor. In column 6, the total number of patients receiving a new kidney from using the
priority mechanism is reported. In column 7, the share of total patients receiving a new
kidney is reported.
From table 6, it is clear that maintaining the current system (not allowing for
list exchange) but selecting a matching with the priority mechanism is preferable to the
current situation. Looking at table 7 and thus extending the current system to include
list exchange further improves the kidney match. Figure 5 compares the performance of
the priority mechanism with and without list exchange for different numbers of
incompatible donors. From figure 5, it is possible to conclude that including list exchange
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Table 6: Number of Patients Matched - Without List Exchange
Paired Compatible Cadaveric Total Percentage
Share
0% 182.78 1.22 251 435 71.66 %
25% 261.78 1.62 249.15 512.22 84.44 %
50% 312.38 2.05 240.24 554.67 91.38 %
75% 374.18 1.93 215.07 591.18 97.39 %
100% 417.24 1.84 184.17 603.25 99.38 %
Table 7: Number of Patients Matched - With List Exchange
Paired Compatible List Exchange Cadaveric Total Percentage
Share
0% 182.46 1.54 0 251 435 71.66 %
25% 264.64 1.89 2.1 250.88 519.51 85.59 %
50% 335.94 1.66 19.4 223.83 580.83 95.69 %
75% 379.86 2.01 10.02 213.45 605.34 99.73 %
100% 416.88 2.06 0 187 605.94 99.83 %
is preferable. As the share of patients who have an incompatible donor increases, the
number of patients who receive a new kidney increases at a diminishing rate. In the
simulated environment, if at least 75% of the patients have a donor nearly every patient
receives a new kidney when using the priority mechanism with list exchange. Given that
every patient has a donor and that the priority mechanism without list exchange is used,
only four patients are left without a new kidney. For not very unrealistic shares of
patients with incompatible donors such as 50% and 75%, both mechanisms match at least
91% of the patients with a new kidney. Since only 71.66% of all patients were given a
new kidney in 2011, adopting either version of the priority mechanism in Sweden would
greatly improve the chances for patients to receive a new kidney. Looking at column four
in table 7, it might seem odd that the number of patients matched in a w-chain decreases
after share reaches 50% and is zero for a share of 100%. However, given the way the
simulations are conducted this is to be expected. When two patient-donor pairs
participates in a w-chain, one pair donates a kidney to a patient on the cadaver wait-list.
As share increases, the number of patients on the cadaver wait-list, i.e. patients who have
no donor, decreases. As share reaches 100%, there are no such patients and no w-chains
are possible.
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Figure 5: Performance of The Priority Mechanism With and Without List Exchange
6 Concluding Remarks
Are the results from these simulations realistic? As mentioned in section 1, since 2004 a
system has been used in New England to match kidney patients with kidneys. As the
simulations conducted in this paper, the system is to a large extent based on the theory
outlined in section 3. As mentioned in section 1, the system in New England has
generated positive results as did the simulations in this paper. From these experiences, it
seems reasonable to assume that adopting a new system in Sweden, based on the
mechanisms discussed in section 3, would give more patients a new kidney. However, the
simulations conducted in this paper are to a certain extent not based on data from the
Swedish kidney patient-donor population. Regarding patient-donor blood types it is
reasonable to assume that, in accordance with the law of large numbers, as the number of
patients and donors increases, blood-type distributions follow those of table 2, table 3
and table 5. However, the risk for positive crossmatch is solely based on data from the
American kidney patient-donor population introducing uncertainty to the simulations. If
the risk for positive crossmatch does not differ too much between the Swedish and
American kidney transplant populations the results are still valid.
Regardless of how similar the simulated patient-donor population is to the real
population, it is apparent from theoretical, empirical, and simulated evidence that
adopting a mechanism based on the discussion in section 3 would increase the number of
kidney transplants in Sweden. Thus, importance is not to be put on the exact simulated
numbers, emphasis should rather be put on that the numbers suggest that an
implementation of a matching mechanism would improve the situation for Swedish kidney
patients. If decision makers would be interested in changing the current system, more
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exact simulations could be conducted given the existence of the required data. In such
simulations, different scenarios could be considered regarding for example the size of the
cycles/w-chains, dynamic settings and the inclusion of altruistically unbalanced exchange.
When only paired exchange is a possibility, simulations could be based on Jack Edmond’s
algorithm further increasing the number of paired matches. As mentioned in section 4,
and suggested by table 6 and table 7, gains from kidney exchange is, amongst other
things, dependent on how many patients who have a donor. Thus, in order to simulate
the effects of a new matching mechanism, having access to data regarding the number of
patients who have an incompatible donor is crucial.
Results suggest that extending the current system to include the possibility for
patients to participate in list exchange would further increase the number of patients who
receive a new kidney. This makes intuitive sense as well, since patient-donor pairs are
given incentives to donate a kidney. Moreover, the costs of setting up a new system based
on the priority mechanism ought to be marginal in comparison to the number of patients
who would benefit from such a system. However, coordination between hospitals is
required and as many hospitals as possible should form part of the system. Since the
performance of the matching algorithms improves as the patient-donor population grows,
a Scandinavian or even European kidney exchange system could be organized. Such a
system would be even more beneficial for the patients.
If a system was to be set up in Sweden, a starting point could be to only
conduct paired exchanges and to not allow for altruistically unbalanced exchange. As
patients and doctors learn and hopefully trust the system, the system could be extended
to include three-way exchanges and altruistically unbalanced exchange. Such an
extension would further improve the performance of the matching mechanism.
In conclusion, theoretical, empirical and simulated evidence presented in this
paper suggest that decision makers could, rather easily, organize a system which would
improve the situation for many of the Swedish patients in need of a new kidney.
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